Review of “The Literary Wittgenstein” by Sandis, Constantine
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 7
Issue 1 Liberalism, Feminism, Multiculturalism Article 13
1-2006
Review of “The Literary Wittgenstein”
Constantine Sandis
Oxford Brookes University
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Sandis, Constantine (2006) "Review of “The Literary Wittgenstein”," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 13.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/sandisrev.html[9/18/2009 5:09:47 PM]
Essays in Philosophy
A Biannual Journal
Vol. 7, No. 1, January 2006
Book Review
The Literary Wittgenstein, John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), Routledge: London, 2004, 368pp
(index, ix in Preface), $33.95 (pbk), ISBN 0415289734.
This book is a collection of twenty essays by eighteen authors (Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond offer
two essays each), all but three of which are previously unpublished. The general aim of the book is to
apply a Wittgensteinian methodology to literary theory and the philosophy of literature, tackling
questions related to deconstruction, the nature of poetic language, the relevance of literature to
philosophy, the logic and semantics of fictional discourse, and more besides. Literary figures discussed in
the book include Joseph Conrad, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Arthur Conan Doyle, William Faulkner, Friedrich
Holderlin, and William Shakespeare.
The contributions are all written by academics (mainly philosophers) known for their work on either
Wittgenstein (e.g. Joachim Schulte, Cora, Diamond, Dale Jacquette, and Rupert Read), aesthetics
(e.g. Richard Eldridge, John Gibson, Bernard Harrison, and David Schalkwyk), or both (e.g.
Stanley Cavell, James Guetti, Garry L. Hagberg, and Marjorie Perloff). The dominating reading—or
rather set of readings—of Wittgenstein influencing most (though by no means all) of the pieces
collected here is what has come to be known as ‘The New Wittgenstein’, best distinguished from
older readings by (a) its insistence that the methodological and philosophical gap between the
Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations is much narrower than was previously believed (b)
its willingness to ascribe to both the early and the later Wittgenstein the view that philosophy
differs (or at any rate ought to differ) from poetry in degree rather than kind, as well as the related
conviction that how he said something was at least as important as what he said, and (c) its
adherence to the view that the subject matter of philosophy is not a series of topics or even
problems but rather the totality of philosophical texts, where the criteria for what counts as the latter
are typically defined in terms of (b) above. This is not the place to mount a critique of this new
wave of Wittgensteinian interpretation, so let me instead content myself by merely warning the
reader that she should not let the spirit of this volume mislead her into thinking that the general
approach to philosophy adopted therein is a necessary characteristic of Wittgensteinian
methodology, let alone one espoused by Wittgenstein himself, a point partly brought home by
Joseph Margolis in the concluding essay of the volume (see below).
The book begins with a helpful introductory essay by Wolfgang Huemer before dividing into five
parts of descending length: Part I is comprised of seven pieces, II of five, III of four, IV of two, and
V of just one. In this review I shall attempt to briefly summarise the main ideas introduced in each
section, with criticism focusing on common themes and ideas, with occasional reference to a
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representative number of essays.
The essays which make up Part I (‘Philosophy as a kind of literature/Literature as a kind of
philosophy’) share the common aim of challenging the widespread view that what distinguishes
philosophical texts from literary ones is that the former (but not the latter) aim to describe truths
about the world, in much the same was as science does, whilst the latter (but not the former) is
concerned with conveying beauty and emotion, rather than fact. I have much sympathy for this
view. For one, as Wittgenstein often stressed, philosophy is not an activity which helps us to attain
new facts (be they empirical or metaphysical). Rather—if we are lucky—it enlightens by leading to
new ways of understanding, in particular understanding of how philosophical confusions arise.
Literature too is concerned with understanding, however it is rarely concerned with understanding
how it is that philosophical problems arise. Thus it is, I think, misleading to talk of ‘philosophy as a
kind of literature’ and of ‘literature as a kind of philosophy’. Whatever one may think of
Wittgenstein’s literary aspirations, most philosophy—including most good philosophy—is not (and
does not aspire to be) a kind of literature. Likewise, although there is much philosophising to be
found in literature, it is no more than can be found in many fields of science, politics, history, law,
and psychology (think, for example, of the confused ramblings which make up the concluding
chapter of Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time).
The articles in Part II (‘Reading with Wittgenstein’) aim to show how it is that Wittgenstein’s
philosophy of language can help us to read literary texts. Thus for example, Sonia Sedivy and
Martin Stone both convincingly appeal to Wittgenstein in a successful attempt to show why the
post-modern view that the meaning of a literary text is generated by the reader is fundamentally
confused. In a similar spirit, Joachim Schulte appeals to Wittgenstein’s contrast between live and
dead signs in the hope of providing an account of how it is that we can grasp the content of a poem.
Schulte writes clearly and for the most part persuasively, though the reader must be warned that the
term ‘content’ is being used here in an extremely loose sense. Cora Diamond’s contributions on the
notion of morals that are ‘not in a text’ are far harder to follow, and to the extent that I could make
sense of them, seemed to be suggesting that Wittgenstein rightly held the view that the ethical is
something unutterable that can only be conveyed through its absence from a text (pp. 129-31). But
there is a tension between this view and Diamond’s own notorious ‘resolute’ interpretation of the
Tractatus, according to which we must not ascribe to Wittgenstein the blatantly incoherent view
that what cannot be said can nonetheless be thought or grasped in some way. Diamond believes
(and, more importantly, believes that the early Wittgenstein believed) that what cannot be said
cannot be shown either, but the nonsensical propositions we use in an attempt to say what cannot be
said (or shown) nonetheless elucidate something (namely the fact that language often misleads us
into thinking that we have said something when in actual fact we have failed). But now we must
ask whether the ethical that is said to be contained in the work through its being absent (whatever
that means) is meant to be something that can be shown or if it is merely the case that its absence
elucidates. If the former, then the ‘resolute’ reading cannot be right. If the latter, I cannot see how
what is meant to be elucidated could possibly be conceived of as being ethical. Indeed, it does not
even make sense to talk of something unutterable as being ethical. At best the absence of ethical
statements would elucidate that ethics is not possible, and yet it is clear that Wittgenstein thought it
was important; this brings us back to the tension with the ‘resolute’ reading for it can only allow
that nonsense is important in the sense that it can elucidate something non-ethical.
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Part III, ‘Literature and the boundaries of self and sense’, addresses questions relating to personal
identity, and the nature of the self. The contributions in this section highlight some interesting
parallels between Wittgenstein’s method and style and that of various novelists (such as Conrad and
Faulkner), but, with the exception of Rupert Read’s essay on whether we can understand people
suffering from severe mental illness, rarely go beyond this.
Part IV, ‘Fiction and the Tractatus’, contains just what it says on the tin: two essays on the
Tractatus and the notion of fictionality. The first essay, by Alex Burri examines what a Tractarian
theory of literature might look like while the second, by Dale Jacquette, focuses more specifically
on what a Tractarian logic of fiction would look like, and whether it could succeed. Both essays ask
revealing questions about the Tractatus and will no doubt be useful to any reader interested in the
early Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning.
The fifth and final section of the book, ‘The Larger View’, is solely comprised of Joseph Margolis’
pessimistically-titled essay on ‘unlikely prospects for applying Wittgenstein’s “method” to
aesthetics and the philosophy of art’ in which Margolis questions whether it is at all possible to
find such a thing as a ‘general method’ in Wittgenstein’s thought. It is a useful (not to mention
brave) move to end the book on such a critical note, for if Margolis is right (and some of what he
says is certainly persuasive) then the very project which motivates this collection is threatened.
Either way, this book will undoubtedly become required reading for Wittgensteinians working in
aesthetics.
Constantine Sandis
Oxford Brookes University
